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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 
The global financial crisis of the late 2000s has been the subject of much debate and 
analysis. The crisis of 2007-2008 had a massive impact on banks and financial 
institutions as well as the way in which they were regulated. The beginning of the 
'trouble' can be traced back to 2007, when a downturn in the United States real estate 
market fuelled the crisis around the world. The deep integration of global banking, 
funding and securities markets were the key parameters which led to the spread of the 
US recession, affecting many European states. Clearly, the most large financial 
institutions failed to measure and manage the risks to which they were exposed, while 
the public authorities were proved to be ill-equipped to deal adequately with bank 
crises.  
 
The financial crisis demonstrated the need for closing the gaps and weaknesses in the 
system for bank regulation and supervision, demanding a better legal framework. The 
response to the crisis by the US and European authorities was significant and 
unprecedented. The passing of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in July 2010, the biggest reform in the US since the Great Depression, 
was a timely reflection of the need to promote financial stability and to protect US 
economy from any abusive financial services practices. Similarly, the European 
authorities introduced the European Banking Union aimed at providing future 
guarantees for eurozone banking system, and especially the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive as a legislative measure to harmonize and improve the tools for 
dealing with future bank crises. This paper aims to clearly illustrate the resolution 
scheme and specifically the resolution tools that are able to be applied to the financial 
institutions which are failing or likely to fail under the Dodd-Frank Act and the BRRD. 
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Introduction 
 
 It is strongly supported-even before the global financial crisis of 2007-2008- that 
banks even are nothing more nor less than financial intermediaries, they are regarded 
as a special business type, receiving a differentiated regulatory treatment.1 The 
response of the US and European authorities to the recent credit crisis confirms the 
fact that financial institutions differ fundamentally from other institutions or business 
types. A series of major reforms in bank regulation, supervision and monitoring was 
introduced and -gradually- implemented in the US and Europe. Both global financial 
markets and the related eurozone sovereign debt problems still suffer from the 2007-
2008 large-scale banking rescues ('Too Big To Fail'), strengthening the necessity for a 
tough legal stance on global financial institutions to make sure that they are able to 
face a future credit 'shock'. 
 In the new era, the international developments on the banking sector underlined 
the necessity for national authorities to reinforce cross-border cooperation and to 
review their national resolution regimes. The European Union proposed and 
implemented a new regulatory and supervisory architecture, introducing the European 
Banking Union. The European Banking Union is still 'under construction' and comprises 
three main pillars: a) the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); b) the European 
resolution scheme; features of which are incorporated in the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive and c) the European deposit insurance scheme. The United 
States' response to the global financial calamity of 2007-2008 was the adoption of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The Dodd-Frank Act sought to improve the safety of the financial 
system by: a) establishing a Financial Stability Oversight Council; b) setting up new 
measures for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (hereinafter SIFIs or SIBs); 
c) creating a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; d) reforming the Federal Reserve; 
e) improving transparency in derivatives; and f) introducing new rules on executive pay 
and credit rating agencies.  
                                                 
1
 Bossone, Biagio, 'What makes banks special ? A study of banking, finance, and economic development', 
Policy, Research working paper, no. WPS 2408. Washington, DC: World Bank, August 2000, p. 3-4, 
available online at <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/348281468739569626/What-makes-
banks-special-a-study-of-banking-finance-and-economic-development>, accessed 28 December 2018. For 
a comprehensive analysis of the nature of banks, the banking activities and the bank regulation, see also 
Cranston, Ross., 'Principles of Banking Law', 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, p. 3 et seq. 
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 Considering the bank resolution regime as an alternative to normal insolvency 
procedures,2 the need for a lex specialis in banking is rooted in their role as financial 
intermediaries, as the lex generalis is unsuited to stop a stampeding panic.3 Bank 
resolution regime is a tool that aims at 'public interest' objectives, as well as the failure 
of restructuring a financial institution that is failing or likely to fail, could threaten the 
financial stability and the retail depositors4. There is much of discussion about the 
applicable resolution tools under the BRRD and Dodd Frank Act, as both of them share 
the same goal but follow different paths. The present paper takes us from Europe to 
the US in an effort to discern patterns in policy-making that may or may not suggest an 
ideological and cultural shift from the norms of pre-crisis liberalism.5 
 
1. The International Regulatory Developments on Bank  
Resolution 
 
 Beyond Europe and the US, there is a lot of policy discussion about the need to 
establish an effective management and coordination framework at international level. 
During the crisis, meetings of the G76 and G207 started highlighting the weaknesses of 
the international banking architecture, pledging to strengthen the international 
coordination and to rebuild the international banking architecture so as to achieve a 
sound and stable financial market. Other international organizations, such as IMF,8 
underlined the necessity to reassess the analysis of risks and the effectiveness of 
surveillance; while the BCBS9 introduced -through Basel III- new guidelines for capital 
                                                 
2
 A. Campbell and R. M. Lastra, 'Definition of bank insolvency and types of bank insolvency proceedings', 
in R. M. Lastra (ed.), Cross Border Bank Insolvency, (Oxford University Press), 2011.   
3
 C. Goodhart, 'Foreword', in R. M. Lastra (ed.), 'Cross-border Bank Insolvency', Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. v. 
4
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Resolution policies and frameworks - progress so far', 
July 2011, available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf>, p. 1, accessed on 28 December 
2018. 
5
 Glinavos, Ioannis., 'Redefining the Market-State Relationship: Responses to the financial crisis and the 
future of regulation', Routledge Research in Finance and Banking Law,  1st edition, 2014, p. 115. 
6
See, Central Banking Newsdesk, 'G-7 leaders pledge coordinated effort to tackle economic crisis' (12 
September 2011), available online at <https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking/news/2108649/ 
leaders-pledge-ordinated-effort-tackle-economic-crisis>, accessed 29 December 2018. 
7
See Turalay Kenc, 'Response of the G20 to the Global Financial Crisis' (27 August 2015), available online 
at<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/conferences/shared/pdf/g20framework/Keynote_Turalay.pdf?edff74ffbc
8baa7e40d93a445ead7067>, accessed 29 December 2018.  
8
See, International Monetary Fund, 'IMF Survey: After Financial Crisis, IMF Review How It Assesses Risks' 
(24 March 2011), available online at <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/ 
sopol032411a>, accessed 29 December 2018.  
9
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems', (December 2010-rev June 2011) available online at                                       
<https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>, accessed 29 December 2018, See Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 'Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms' (December 2017), available online at                          
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and banking regulation. In parallel, the FSB mentioned the necessity to fix the fault 
lines of the global financial crisis, promising reforms that are designed to prevent 
systemic crises.10  
 
1.1. The Basel Committee's on Banking Supervision Resolution Reforms 
 The Committee's reform package includes efforts to strengthen the resolution 
regime of systemically important cross-border financial institutions. The Cross-Border 
Bank Resolution Group (CBRG) of the BCBS issued recommendations for cross-
border crises resolutions,11 pointing the necessity for: i) effective national resolution 
powers; ii) frameworks for a coordinated resolution of financial groups; iii) convergence 
of national resolution measures; iv) cross-border effects of national resolution 
measures; v) reduction of complexity and interconnectedness of group structures and 
operations; vi) planning in advance for orderly resolution; vii) cross-border cooperation 
and information sharing; viii) strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms; ix) transfer of 
contractual relationships and  x) exit strategies and market discipline.12  
 The Committee addressed the absence of appropriate resolution tools during 
the crisis and the ad hoc national response which most of the times was based on the 
public support.13 The Committee, in line with the weakness of the competent authorities 
to act quickly due to the absence of well-designed resolution tools, underlined the 
challenges in resolving a cross-border financial institution, as their complexity is 
incompatible with the national resolution frameworks that are largely designed to deal 
with domestic failures.14 An effective resolution regime prerequisites the appropriate 
resolution tools to deal with all types of financial institution in difficulties in order to 
                                                                                                                                               
<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf>, accessed 29 December 2018. See also the BSCS's attempts to 
promote a paradigm for domestic banking regulation and a basis for an international cooperative 
agreement at Tarullo, K. Daniel., 'Banking on Basel: The future of International Financial Regulation, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008. 
10
See Financial Stability Board, 'Improving Financial Regulation: Report of the Financial Stability Board to 
G20 Leaders' (25 September 2009), available online at <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
r_090925b.pdf?page_moved=1>, accessed 29 December 2018.  
11
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, accessed 29 
December 2018.  
12
For a comprehensive analysis of the recommendations, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online 
at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, accessed 29 December 2018. 
13
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, p. 3, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
14
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, p. 4, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
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maintain stability, minimize systemic risk15, protect deposits, limit moral hazard and 
promote market discipline.16 The Committee continued, referring tools that will improve 
national resolution frameworks such as bridge financial institutions; private-sector or 
market-based solutions.17 Lastly, the Committee pointed the need through special 
resolution tools, the competent authorities to achieve continuity of the failed or likely to 
fail financial institution's key functions; or to achieve an orderly resolution that will apply 
perfectly not only at national, but also at international levels.18 
1.2. The Financial Stability Board's Key Attributes of effective resolution regimes  
for Financial Institutions 
 A start was made in discussing the gaps and weaknesses of international 
financial regime at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh when G20 leaders called for action to 
address the 'Too Big To Fail' (hereinafter TBTF) institutions as the large-scale banking 
rescues during the crisis have raised serious concerns about the social and economic 
costs of 'too systemically important to fail'. The FSB adopted the twelve Key Attributes 
('KAs') in October 2011 and the G20 Heads of States and Government subsequently 
endorsed the FSB comprehensive policy framework19, comprising 'a new international 
standard for resolution regimes'; more intensive and effective supervision; 
requirements for cross-border cooperation and recovery and resolution planning; and 
additional loss absorbency for those banks determined as global systemically important 
financial institutions (G-SIFIs).20   
  The KAs set out the core elements that the FSB considers to be necessary for 
an effective resolution regime relating to: 1) scope; 2) resolution authority; 3) resolution 
powers; 4) set-off; netting; collateralisation; segregation of client assets; 5) safeguards; 
6) funding of firms in resolution; 7) legal framework conditions for cross-border 
                                                 
15
 See more for the elements of the systemic risk and the 'domino effect' in Cranston, Ross., 'Principles of 
Banking Law', 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 66 et seq. 
16
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, p. 1, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
17
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, p. 1, 22, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
18
 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank 
Resolution Group' (March 2010), available online at <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>, p. 26-27, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
19
 See Financial Stability Board, 'Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions' 
(October 2011), available online at <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_111104cc.pdf>, accessed 29 
December 2018.  
20
 See G20, 'Cannes Summit Final Declaration–Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action 
for the Benefit of All' (4 November 2011), available online at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-
cannes-declaration-111104-en.html>, paras. 28-29, accessed 29 December 2018.  
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cooperation; 8) crisis management groups (CMGs); 9) institution-specific cross-border 
cooperation agreements; 10) resolvability assessments; 11) recovery and resolution 
planning and 12) access to information and information sharing.21 
 The KAs present that an effective resolution regime should: (i) ensure continuity 
of systemically important financial services, and payment, clearing and settlement 
functions; (ii) protect, where applicable and in coordination with the relevant insurance 
schemes and arrangements such depositors; insurance policy holders and investors as 
are covered by such schemes and arrangements, and ensure the rapid return of 
segregated client assets; (iii) allocate losses to firm owners (shareholders) and 
unsecured and uninsured creditors in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims; 
(iv) not rely on public solvency support and not create an expectation that such support 
will be available; (v) avoid unnecessary destruction of value, and therefore seek to 
minimise the overall costs of resolution in home and host jurisdictions and -where 
consistent with the other objectives- losses for creditors; (vi) provide for speed and 
transparency and as much predictability as possible through legal and procedural 
clarity and advanced planning for orderly resolution; (vii) provide a mandate in law for 
cooperation, information exchange and coordination domestically and with relevant 
foreign resolution authorities before and during a resolution; (viii) ensure that non-
viable firms can exit the market in an orderly way; and (ix) be credible, and thereby 
enhance market discipline and provide incentives for market-based solutions.22 
 In 2014, the FSB adopted additional guidance on implementing and interpreting 
specific KAs, while the twelve KAs remain the umbrella standard for resolution regimes 
covering financial institutions of all types that could be systemic in failure.23 The 
guidance defines a SIFI as 'resolvable' if it is feasible and credible for the resolution 
authorities to resolve it in a way that protects systemically important functions without 
severe systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss.24 Lastly, the sector-
specific guidance characterises the resolution of cross-border financial institutions as 
                                                 
21
 See Financial Stability Board, 'Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions'   
(15 October 2014), available online at <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf>, p. 1, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
22
 See Financial Stability Board, 'Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions'  
(15 October 2014), available online at <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf>, p. 3, 
accessed 29 December 2018 
23
 See Financial Stability Board, 'Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions'   
(15 October 2014), available online at <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf>, p. 2, 
accessed 29 December 2018.  
24
 See Financial Stability Board, 'Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions'   
(15 October 2014), available online at <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf>, p. 27, 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
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feasible, when the authorities have the necessary legal powers - and the practical 
capacity to apply them - to ensure the continuity of functions critical to the economy; 
while for resolution to be credible, the application of those resolution tools should not 
itself give rise to unacceptably adverse broader consequences for the financial system 
and the real economy.25 
 
2. The European Regulatory Developments on Bank Resolution 
 
 In the European Union, a new regulatory architecture started taking place along 
the lines initially highlighted in the de Larosiere Report.26 In this second chapter of the 
paper, the European steps towards a robust regulatory and supervisory framework of 
the financial institutions will be outlined. Also, an analysis of the resolution tools in light 
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive will be attempted. 
2.1. Background  
 Undoubtedly, the financial crisis in 2008 demonstrated the lack of a clear and 
predictable legal framework in Europe to reorganize or liquidate, in an orderly way, any 
type of distressed financial institution, without undermining financial stability.27 The 
Directive on the Recognition and Winding-up of Credit Institutions28 was focused on 
issues of conflicts of laws and mutual recognition without providing any substantive 
provisions for bank insolvency laws throughout the EU.29 Once the dust from the initial 
credit crunch started to settle,30 Europe made the first steps for a new regulatory and 
supervisory framework for the financial institutions started in 2010 -mainly through 
Regulations- and specifically: Regulation 1092/2010 that established the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB); Regulation 1093/2010 that established the European 
                                                 
25
 Ibid,. 
26
 See Stephen Valdez and Philip Molyneux, An Introduction to Global Financial Markets (8th edition, 
Palgrave, 2016), p. 135. 
27
 See Prof. Kern Alexander, 'House of Lords EU Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs Inquiry into 
reform of the EU banking sector' (2012), available online at <https://www.ius.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:00000000-
6613-eef0-0000-000025004ae8/House_of_Lords_Evidence_European_Banking_Union.pdf>, p. 2, acces- 
sed 29 December 2018. 
28
 See Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, (Official Journal L 125 , 05/05/2001), available online at 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0024>, accessed 29 December 2018. 
29
 See A. Campbell and R. M. Lastra, 'Definition of bank insolvency and types of bank insolvency 
proceedings', in R. M. Lastra (ed.), Cross Border Bank Insolvency, (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 28. 
30
 Glinavos, Ioannis., 'Redefining the Market-State Relationship: Responses to the financial crisis and the 
future of regulation', Routledge Research in Finance and Banking Law,  1st edition, 2014, p. 120. 
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Banking Authority (EBA); Regulation 1094/2010 establishing the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority; Regulation 1095/2010 establishing the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the Regulation 1096/2010 about the 
assigned competencies of the European Central Bank (ECB) in relation to ESRB's 
operations, composing the so-called European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS).  
2.2. European Banking Union31 
 In 2012,32 Europe, outlined proposals for the European Banking Union (EMU) 
as a future safeguard scheme for the eurozone banking system including decoupling 
both banking sector and sovereign risk.33 The establishment of the EMU has brought 
central banking governance into the spotlight.34 The three pillars of the EMU were 
gradually regulated through the following legal instruments: the Regulation 1024/2013 
about the ECB's prudential supervision of credit institutions; the Capital Requirement 
Regulation; the Capital Requirement Directive IV - while the CRD V package is on its 
way-; the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive35; and the Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme Directive,36 as the 'complete' banking union in Europe in still under -political- 
discussion.  
 
 
                                                 
31
 See Miglionico., Andrea, 'Rethinking the resolution tools for the distressed banks: a new challenge in the 
banking union?' (2018), J.I.B.L.R. 33(9), p.  314 where the author parallels the greek word 'crepidoma' with 
the three pillars of the EBU. Specifically, 'in ancient Greek architecture, crepidoma was a three-level 
platform upon which the pillars supporting the super-structure of an ancient temple were erected. Each 
level decreased in size but increased in height in order to ensure a strong support to the pillars and a 
panoramic view of the temple by being slightly curved in contrast to the complete linearity of the pillars. 
The single rulebook, which aims to harmonise financial safety-net rules across the EBU, can be paralleled 
with the crepidoma upon which the three-pillars structure of the EBU is established. In particular, the 
crepidoma of the EBU is formed by the three steps of the capital requirements framework, bank recovery 
and resolution and deposit guarantee directives'. 
32
 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, COM(2012) 280/3. 
The draft Directive is also known as the Crisis Management Directive. 
33
 See Stephen Valdez and Philip Molyneux, 'An Introduction to Global Financial Markets' (8th edition, 
Palgrave, 2016), p. 120. 
34
 For a comprehensive analysis of the central banking governance before and after the establishment of 
the EMU in the EU, see Quaglia, Lucia., 'Central Banking Governance in the European Union: A 
comparative analysis', Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies, 2008. 
35
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of 
the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance). 
36
 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit 
guarantee schemes (recast) (Text with EEA relevance). 
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2.2.1. The Second Pillar 
 The second pillar or key element towards a European Banking Union is referred 
to a European resolution scheme that has to be mainly funded by financial institutions 
and is able to support in the application of measures to institutions overseen by the 
European competent supervisory authorities. The main aim is to provide a mechanism 
for an orderly shutdown or winding-up of 'troubled' financial institutions, protecting the 
public funds. The minimum harmonizing features of the European resolution scheme 
are incorporated in the Recovery and Resolution Directive which applies to all credit 
institutions and certain investment firms; and requires firms to have 'living wills' 
(meaning resolution plans), provides for supervisory early intervention powers; 
specifies minimum harmonized resolution tools, establishes pre-funded resolution 
funds and national deposit guarantee schemes, as elements that will be configured for 
resolution funding purposes.37 
 
2.3. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
 The BRRD38 sets out a common recovery and resolution regime for the 
European Union that aims to 'help member states prevent bank crises from emerging 
in the first place and; if such bank crises still emerge, to manage them in a more 
orderly and effective way'.39 The BRRD40 is a minimum harmonizing legal framework 
that allows national authorities to retain a degree of discretion regarding their national 
bank insolvency legislation to the extent that they meet and preserve the objectives 
and principles of the Directive 2014/59.41  
                                                 
37
 See Stephen Valdez and Philip Molyneux, 'An Introduction to Global Financial Markets' (8th edition, 
Palgrave, 2016), p. 474. 
38
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of 
the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190-348), available online at 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059>, accessed 01 January 2019. 
39
 European Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union' (COM/2012/0510 final, 12 September 2012), available 
online at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0510>, accessed 1 
January 2019. 
40
Member States were required to transpose into national laws the Directive by 31 December 2014 and to 
apply them from 1 January 2015; and to delay the application of the bail-in measures until 1 January 2016. 
See BRRD, Art 130 (1) according to which "1. Member States shall adopt and publish by 31 December 
2014 the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They 
shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those measures. Member States shall apply 
those measures from 1 January 2015. However, Member States shall apply provisions adopted in order to 
comply with Section 5 of Chapter IV of Title IV from 1 January 2016 at the latest". 
41
 BRRD, Recital (1) "The financial crisis has shown that there is a significant lack of adequate tools at 
Union level to deal effectively with unsound or failing credit institutions and investment firms (‘institutions’). 
A Comparative analysis of the EU and the US bank resolution regimes: The resolution tools 
under the BRRD and the Dodd Frank Act 
 
  -9- 
 The BRRD applies to credit institutions that are established in the Union, to the 
investment firms that hold a particular minimum initial capital and are established in the 
Union, to the subsidiaries of a parent credit institution or an investment firm that is 
supervised in the European Union or financial holding companies, and to  
financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and mixed-activity 
holding companies that are established in the Union.42  
 Under the Directive, the resolution authorities43 are equipped with new tools and 
powers to restructure an ailing bank to avoid the destructive effects of liquidation by 
means of a bail-in, take-over of the business, separation of it into good bank and bad 
bank, and/or using a bridge bank.44 
 
2.4. The Resolution Tools under the BRRD 
 Resolution tools consist of special bank restructuring measures applicable by 
the administrative authorities empowered to handle crisis management outside of 
ordinary judicial insolvency proceedings, producing different effects on the bank and on 
third parties. 45  
           The BRRD's resolution objectives and general principles do not constitute a 
mere 'wish-list' of the resolution authority but play a critical role in the application of the 
resolution tools.46 According to the BRRD47, the resolution authorities when applying 
                                                                                                                                               
Such tools are needed, in particular, to prevent insolvency or, when insolvency occurs, to minimise 
negative repercussions by preserving the systemically important functions of the institution concerned. 
During the crisis, those challenges were a major factor that forced Member States to save institutions 
using taxpayers’ money. The objective of a credible recovery and resolution framework is to obviate the 
need for such action to the greatest extent possible". 
42
 BRRD, Art 1(1) according to which "This Directive lays down rules and procedures relating to the 
recovery and resolution of the following entities:(a) institutions that are established in the Union, (b) 
financial institutions that are established in the Union when the financial institution is a subsidiary of a 
credit institution or investment firm, or of a company referred to in point (c) or (d), and is covered by the 
supervision of the parent undertaking on a consolidated basis in accordance with Articles 6 to 17 of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, (c) financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and 
mixed-activity holding companies that are established in the Union, (d) parent financial holding companies 
in a Member State, Union parent financial holding companies, parent mixed financial holding companies in 
a Member State, Union parent mixed financial holding companies, (e) branches of institutions that are 
established outside the Union in accordance with the specific conditions laid down in this Directive". See 
BRRD, Art. 2 (1) (2-15) about definitions. 
43
 The BRRD does not define the national authorities to which authority to entrust crisis resolution must be 
provided (central bank, supervisory authorities, a special crisis management authority or the Finance 
Ministry), resulting in adopting different solutions from member-state to member-state, depending on the 
respective legal framework. See a further analysis of this problem in Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European 
Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial 
Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 7. 
44
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 5. 
45
 Ibid p. 78. 
46
 Aloupi., Olga, 'The interaction of deposit insurance and bank resolution, in particular under the legal 
framework of the European Banking Union' (2018), J.I.B.L.R.  V.33, N.8, 260-261. 
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the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers, must have regard to the 
resolution objectives and choose the tools and powers that best achieve the objectives 
that are relevant in the circumstances and the nature of each case. The Directive48 
promotes the equal significance of the resolution objective, i.e. to ensure the continuity 
of critical functions;49 to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system, in 
particular by avoiding contagion to market infrastructures and by maintaining market 
discipline; to protect public funds by minimizing reliance on extraordinary public 
financial support; to protect insured depositors and insured investors; to protect client 
funds and client assets.50 The Directive adopts an additional consideration when 
pursuing the resolution objectives, that is the obligation of the national authorities to 
seek to minimise the cost of resolution and avoid destruction of value unless necessary 
to achieve the resolution objectives.51  
 The BRRD's52 key principles put losses first to shareholders, and after the 
shareholders, losses must be borne by creditors in accordance with the order of priority 
of their claims (under national -normal- insolvency proceedings and the BRRD); the 
board of directors and the management body must be replaced, unless their 
continuance in office is necessary to pursue the resolution objectives; the parties 
responsible for the institution's failure are subject to civil or criminal liability; the 
application of the 'No Creditor Worse Off' principle according to which creditors of the 
same class are treated in an equitable manner (exceptions are introduced by the 
BRRD53) and no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the 
                                                                                                                                               
47
 BRRD, Art 31 (1) and (3). 
48
 BRRD, Art. 31 (3). 
49
 Milione., Lara and Victor de Seriene, 'De-politicising European bank resolution processes', (2019) 
J.I.B.L.R. 34(2), 73-74, where it is mentioned that "...BBRD's and SRMR's regimes, and the recovery and 
resolution plans that must be put into place, focus primarily on the need to guarantee continuance of what 
are called the "critical functions" of a bank. But governments may hesitate to simply rely on the 
implementation of these rules; in their perception, the European resolution rules as applied by European 
and national resolution authorities may not be effective to deal with crises on the national level and funding 
for implementation of the European resolution tools may be insufficient. There is doubt whether 
supervisory agencies are sufficiently equipped to fully take into account political and social consequences 
of a bank failure...". For a comprehensive analysis of the doubts to the effectiveness of the European rules, 
see Milione., Lara and Victor de Seriene, 'De-politicising European bank resolution processes', (2019) 
J.I.B.L.R. 34(2), p. 72 et seq. 
50
 BRRD, Art 31 (2). 
51
 Ibid,. 
52
 BRRD, Art. 34 (1). 
53
An exception to the NCWO principle is the write down of Cocos instruments. A distinction should be 
made between capital instruments that convert at the point of non-viability (which pursuant to the BRRD 
coincides with the existence of the pre-requirements for resolution except the public interest) and CoCos 
instruments that convert when the capital falls below a certain quantitative threshold. Conversion of the 
CoCos does not require the application of the NCWO principle, because these instruments contain a 
contractual clause according to which the creditors have accepted that their debt will convert into equity 
when certain conditions occur. In this case, the conversion is an effect of the clause and not of the 
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institution or entity had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, and the 
protection of the covered deposits.54 
 At the opening of a resolution procedure, three conditions must be met: 1) The 
bank supervisor or the resolution authority (after consulting SRB or ECB, respectively) 
must have determined that the financial institution is failing or is likely to fail.55 An 
institution is failing or is likely to fail when objective elements support the determination 
that: (a) the institution infringes or will infringe the requirements for continuing 
authorization; or (b) the assets of the institution are or will be less than its liabilities; or 
(c) that the institution is or will be unable to pay its debts or liabilities as they fall due; or 
(d)extraordinary public financial support is required.56 The trigger event is characterized 
by the magnitude of the cases that can be taken into consideration in order to 
determine that the bank is failing or is likely to fail; its purpose is to allow the authorities 
to take the measures necessary for resolution before the bank reaches the point of 
insolvency, from a capital and liquidity point of view.57 Under the Directive's framework, 
the resolution authorities are called to decide on the basis of a comprehensive 
assessment of both quantitative and qualitative elements; 2) the lack of reasonable 
prospect that any alternative private sector measures would prevent the failure of the 
institution within a reasonable timeframe;58 and 3) the commencement of the resolution 
proceedings and selection of the appropriate resolution tools, as a resolution action is 
necessary in the public interest.59 In the application of the third and last condition for 
                                                                                                                                               
statutory action of public authorities. Thus, if convertible Cocos exist at the time of the resolution decision 
and they are converted, because the event triggering their conversion has occurred, the NCWO principle 
does not apply to the Coco holders. For a further analysis, see European Banking Authority, 'Single 
Rulebook Q & A': Resolution objectives and triggers' (11.11.2016), available online at <https://eba.europa. 
eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2015_2181>, accessed 13 January 2019. 
54
According to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive, € 100.000 is an appropriate level of protection 
and should be maintained. Deposits are covered per depositor per bank. This means that the limit of € 
100.000 applies to all aggregated accounts at the same bank. Depositors must be informed that deposits 
held under different brand names of the same bank are not covered separately. However, deposits by the 
same depositor in different banks all benefit from separate protection. See also, Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The 
European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and 
Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 71. 
55
 BRRD, Art. 32 (1) (a). 
56
 BRRD Art 32 (4) (a-d). Especially, the last provision [Art. 32 (4) (d)] is subject to exceptions when, in 
order to remedy a serious. disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability,  
the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) a State guarantee to back 
liquidity facilities provided by central banks according to the central banks' conditions, (ii) a State 
guarantee of newly issued liabilities, or (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at 
prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon institution, provided that the institution is solvent 
and viable at the time the public support is granted.  
57
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 73. 
58
 BRRD, Art. 32 (1) (b). 
59
 BRRD Art 32 (1) (c) and (5), i.e. the resolution objectives would not be met in the same extent if the 
bank were would up under normal insolvency proceedings. 
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triggering bank resolution, the resolution objectives play the most crucial role, being the 
interpretative tools for the 'public interest test'.60 
 Entering the resolution process, the resolution authorities have the most 
penetrating intervention powers which include the authority to write down or convert 
relevant capital requirements into shares or other instruments of ownership at the point 
of non-viability (hereinafter PONV).61 The sequence of the power to write down or 
convert capital instruments at the PONV provides that capital (based on CRR) should 
bear losses first, before other liabilities62 or -in other words- before using any resolution 
tools. Although it is possible that a PONV write down or conversion alone could restore 
a financial institution to viability where losses are limited and the business model 
remains sound, it is more likely that it will be applied at the same time as the resolution 
tools.63  
 The BRRD,64 requires Member States to ensure that resolution authorities have 
full powers to apply resolution tools, providing a minimum set of tools for the orderly 
restructuring of the failed bank, i.e. the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool 
that acts as intermediary, the asset separation tool, and the bail-in tool,65 which may be 
applied either singularly or jointly,66 with an exception relating to the asset separation 
tool which can be applied only in combination with another resolution tool.67  
 In practice, the distinction of the applied resolution tools is not so clear, since a 
resolution action may be the result of a set of operations involving the joint use of 
various resolution tools, such that the survival of the bank may be compatible with the 
sale or liquidation of parts of the group or of the non-viable components of the financial 
institution.68 
 
                                                 
60
 Aloupi., Olga, 'The interaction of deposit insurance and bank resolution, in particular under the legal 
framework of the European Banking Union' (2018), J.I.B.L.R.  V.33, N.8, 260-261. 
61
 BRRD, Art. 59; According to Art. 2 (81) of BRRD "the point of non-viability should be understood as the 
point at which the relevant authority determines that the institution meets the conditions for resolution or 
the point at which the authority decides that the institution would cease to be viable if those capital 
instruments were not written down or converted". 
62
 BRRD, Art. 60. 
63
 Kleftouri Nikoletta, Deposit Protection and Bank Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 
171; see also, Art. 37 (2) of Directive 2014/59/EU "the resolution authority shall exercise the power to write 
down and convert capital instruments...immediately before or together with the application of the resolution 
tool". 
64
 BRRD, Art. 37 (1). 
65
 BRRD, Art. 31 (3). 
66
 BRRD, Art. 37 (4). 
67
 BRRD, Art. 37 (5), e.g. in combination with the sale of the sound elements of the financial institution. 
68
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 79. 
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2.4.1.The sale of Business Tool  
 The sale of business tool 'means the mechanism for effecting the exercise by a 
resolution  authority of shares or other instruments of ownership issued by an institution 
under resolution, or assets, rights or liabilities, of an institution under resolution to a 
purchaser that is not a bridge institution'.69 
 The sale of business tool enables the resolution authorities to transfer to third -
private- parties shares or other instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities of 
an institution under resolution.70 The purchaser is usually another bank and must hold 
authorizations to exercise the activity or to provide the services resulting from the 
sale.71 The transfer is taking place without the consent of the shareholders or any 
procedural obligations based on Member States company or security law.72 The 
resolution authority may exercise the transfer power more than once in order to make 
supplemental transfers of shares or other instruments of ownership issued by an 
institution under resolution.73  
 The transfer is final74 and the transferred financial instruments of property are 
included in the property of the acquirer; the purchaser is considered to be a 
continuation of the institution under resolution, and may continue to exercise any right 
that was exercised by the institution under resolution in respect of the assets, rights or 
liabilities transferred.75  
 Τhe Directive sets out the general operating context, general rules and 
procedural requirements when applying the sale of business tool,76 while the 
specialization of the procedure is entrusted to the national legislator.77 The resolution 
authority must carry out the marketing process when applying the sale of business tool 
in a rapid78 and transparent79 way, without unduly favoring or discriminating the 
                                                 
69
 BRRD, Art 2 (58). 
70
 BRRD, Art. 38 (1) (a-b). 
71
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 90. 
72
 BRRD, Art. 38 (1). See Single Resolution Board, 'What is a bank resolution? Resolution Q&A', available 
online at <https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/resolution-qa>, accessed 1 January 2019. 
73
 BRRD, Art. 38 (5). 
74
 BRRD, Art. 38 (9) (a) "such a transfer of shares or other instruments of ownership to the acquirer shall 
have immediate legal effect". 
75
 BRRD, Art. 38 (9) (a) & (11-12). 
76
 BRRD, Art. 39. 
77
 BRRD Art. 39 (2). 
78
 BRRD, Art. 39 (2) (e). 
79
 BRRD, Art. 39 (2) (a). 
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potential purchasers,80 or conferring any unfair advantage on them, 81 with the objective 
of maximizing the sale price.82   
 In case of partial transfer of assets, rights and liabilities, the shareholders and 
the creditors whose claims have not been transferred must be no worse off than that 
they would have been if the bank had been liquidated according to ordinary insolvency 
proceedings immediately before the transfer.83 
 
2.4.2. The Bridge Institution Tool 
 The BRRD adopts as a resolution tool the transfer of all or any property rights 
and liabilities of the institution under resolution to a bridge institution.84 A bridge 
institution must be a legal person that is wholly or partially owned by one or more public 
authorities (including the resolution authority) and is created for the purpose of 
receiving or holding all or some of the shares, other instruments of ownership, assets, 
rights and liabilities of one or more institutions under resolution, maintaining access to 
critical functions and selling the institution.85 The resolution authority establishes an 
independent,86 temporary legal person87 -without obtaining the consent of the 
shareholders of the institution under resolution88 and- with a specific purpose, i.e. the 
acquisition of property rights of the institution under resolution, preserving the essential 
banking functions89 and the further sale of the bridge institution or its assets, rights or 
liabilities. The bridge institution tool must be licensed in accordance with the Capital 
                                                 
80
 BRRD, Art. 39 (2) (b).  
81
 BRRD, Art. 39 (2) (d). 
82
 BRRD, Art. 39 (2) (f). 
83
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 90. 
84
 BRRD, Art. 40. 
85
 BRRD, Art. 40 (2). 
86
 BRRD, Art. 41 (1) '(a) the contents of the bridge institution’s constitutional documents are approved by 
the resolution authority, (b) subject to the bridge institution’s ownership structure, the resolution authority 
either appoints or approves the bridge institution’s management body, (c) the resolution authority approves 
the remuneration of the members of the management body and determines their appropriate 
responsibilities, (d) the resolution authority approves the strategy and risk profile of the bridge institution, 
(e) the bridge institution is authorised in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU, as 
applicable, and has the necessary authorisation under the applicable national law to carry out the activities 
or services that it acquires by virtue of a transfer made pursuant to Article 63 of this Directive, (f) the bridge 
institution complies with the requirements of, and is subject to supervision in accordance with Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013 and with Directives 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU, as applicable, (g) the 
operation of the bridge institution shall be in accordance with the Union State aid framework and the 
resolution authority may specify restrictions on its operations accordingly'. 
87
 BRRD, Art 2 (60). 
88
 BRRD, Art. 40 (1). 
89
 BRRD, Art. 40 (10) "Member States shall ensure that the bridge institution may continue to exercise the 
rights of membership and access to payment, clearing and settlement systems, stock exchanges, investor 
compensation schemes and deposit guarantee schemes of the institution under resolution, provided that it 
meets the membership and participation criteria for participation in such systems". 
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Requirement Directive and will be operated as a commercial concern within any limits 
prescribed by the State aids framework.90 The bridge institution tool aims to set up a 
bank that can be disposed (preserving the critical functions of the failing bank) and to 
separate it from the rest, while searching for a third party purchaser.91 
 The resolution authorities is competent for the transfer of the property rights and 
liabilities from the institution under resolution to the bridge institution and vice versa; as 
well as the transfer from the latter to a third -private- party purchaser.92 The resolution 
authority must ensure that the total value of transferred liabilities to the bridge 
institution does not exceed the total value of the rights and the assets transferred from 
the institution under resolution (known as funding gap).93 This element is crucial for the 
smooth operation and sustainability of the bridge institution (known also as a 'bridge 
bank')94 and the quick and easy finding of a purchaser. 
 The Directive is referred to the principle of continuity that governs the purposes 
of preserving essential banking functions or facilitate continuous. access to deposits95 
through the temporary structure of a bridge institution.96 According to the Directive,97 a 
bridge institution -for the purposes of exercising the rights to provide services or to 
establish itself in another EU state in accordance with the European legal framework98 
or for other purposes-, must be considered to be a continuation of the institution under 
resolution, and may continue to exercise any such right that was exercised by the 
institution under resolution in respect of the assets, rights or liabilities transferred. 
 The further purpose of establishing a bridge institution is to sell the transferred 
property rights and liabilities to one or more third purchasers when the market 
conditions are appropriate. The bridge institution is able either to sell all or substantially 
                                                 
90
 BRRD, Art. 41 (1); see also, European Commission, 'Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010' (6 June 2012), p. 13, available online at <http: //www. europarl.europa.eu /RegData/ docs 
_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0280/COM_COM(2012)0280_EN.pdf>, accessed 
2 January 2019. 
91
 See Single Resolution Board, 'What is a bank resolution? Resolution Q&A', available online at               
<https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/resolution-qa>, accessed 1 January 2019. 
92
 BRRD, Art. 40 (6). 
93
 BRRD, Art. 40 (3). 
94
 European Commission, 'MEMO: EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): Frequently Asked 
Questions' (15 April 2014), available online at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
297_el.htm>, accessed 2 January 2019. 
95
 See, footnote 74. 
96
 European Commission, 'MEMO: EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): Frequently Asked 
Questions' (15 April 2014), available online at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
297_el.htm>, accessed 2 January 2019. 
97
 BRRD, Art. 40 (9). 
98
 See Directive 2013/36/EU or Directive 2014/65/EU. 
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all of its rights or liabilities to a third party99 or to be merged with another institution.100 
The resolution authority must terminate the operation of a bridge institution two years 
after the date on which the last transfer from an institution under resolution to the 
bridge institution was made,101 while it is possible to extend the two year period after a 
reasoned and detailed assessment, that justifies the extension.102  
 In cases that the operations of the bridge institutions are terminated because of 
the sale of all or substantially all of the bridge institution‟s assets, rights or liabilities to a 
third party or resolution of the bridge institution due to time limitations, the bridge 
institution must be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.103 The proceeds 
generated as a result of the termination of the operation of the bridge institution must 
benefit the shareholders of the bridge institution104. 
 An important issue to bridge bank resolution tool is the treatment of the 
shareholders and creditors who do not have any right on the bridge bank, but only on 
the residual value realized from its sale after paying other creditors and the expenses 
associated with the management of the crisis.105 
 Lastly, the application of the bridge institution tools requires the assets' 
evaluation in order to transfer the good assets, and to leave the net of the doubtful 
positions back into the financial institution under resolution.106 
 
2.4.2.1. The sale of Business Tool versus the Bridge Institution Tool 
 The sale of business and the bridge institution tool constitute the so-called 
transfer of property resolution structure. The resolution is taking place through the 
separation of the instruments of ownership and liabilities of the institution under 
resolution in order to be transferred to a third -sound- private legal person that will 
                                                 
99
 BRRD, Art. 41 (3) (c). 
100
 BRRD, Art. 40 (3) (a). 
101
 BRRD, Art. 41 (5). 
102
 BRRD, Art. 41 (7). It should be mentioned that the final text of Directive 2014/59/EU did not provide an 
upper period limit of the extension of the bridge institution's operation, while the proposal had set out an up 
to three additional year period. See, European Commission, 'Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 
82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC 
and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010' (6 June 2012), p. 82, available online at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/02
80/COM_COM(2012)0280_EN.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2019. 
103
 BRRD, Art. 41 (8). 
104
 BRRD, Art. 41 (8). 
105
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 91. 
106
 Ibid,. 
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preserve and exercise the bank's critical functions. Both resolution tools take steps to 
ensure liquidity of the institution under resolution through the proceeds from the sale -
directly or indirectly through the bridge institution- of the bank's critical functions.107  
 The definition under Art. 2 (55) and Art. 38 (1) of the Directive separates the 
sale of institution from the bridge institution resolution tool. Both resolution tools 
resemble a lot; as a transfer of instruments of ownership is taking place from the 
institution under resolution to a private purchaser.  
 However, the different articles that specify the two resolution tools under the 
BRRD and their operating procedure; as the bridge institution maintains the transferred 
property rights from the institution under resolution, until the market conditions are 
appropriate for their profitable sale (i.e. a two step sale process); while the sale of 
business tool transfers directly (i.e. one step sale process) the instruments of 
ownership, shares, assets or liabilities to a third purchaser, by way of sale of financial 
instruments.108 
 
2.4.3. The Asset Separation Tool 
 The asset separation tool should enable authorities to transfer assets, rights or  
liabilities of an institution under resolution to a separate vehicle. The asset separation 
tool is the mechanism for effecting a transfer by a resolution authority of assets, rights 
or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an asset management vehicle.109 The 
asset management vehicle (AMV) is a legal person that is temporarily created to 
receive deteriorated assets or assets that are difficult to measure on the balance sheet 
of the troubled financial institution or of a bridge institution,110 with a view to maximizing 
their value for an eventual sale.111 This resolution tool must be used only in conjunction 
with other tools to prevent an undue competitive advantage for the failing institution.112 
                                                 
107
 Aloupi A. Olga, The Directive 2014/59 on Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, Nomiki Vivliothiki, 
2015, p. 44. 
108
  Ibid,. 
109
  BRRD, Art. 2 (55). 
110
 Boccuzzi, Giuseppe., 'The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution', Palgrave Macmillan 
Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions (series editor: Philip Molyneux), 2016, p. 92. 
111
 BRRD, Art. 42 (3); see also, European Commission, 'MEMO: EU Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD): Frequently Asked Questions' (15 April 2014), available online at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_el.htm>, accessed 2 January 2019. 
112
 BRRD, Art. 2 (66), 37 (5) and 42 (8). "In order to minimise competitive distortions and risks of moral 
hazard, this tool should only be used in conjunction with another resolution tool", see, European 
Commission, 'Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010' (6 June 2012), p. 13, online 
A Comparative analysis of the EU and the US bank resolution regimes: The resolution tools 
under the BRRD and the Dodd Frank Act 
 
  -18- 
The asset separation tool is also known as the split between the 'good' and the 'bad' 
bank and the further separation of the 'good' assets (e.g. performing loans, property 
rights) that is transferred from the institution under resolution to the asset management 
vehicle, while the 'toxic' assets (e.g. non-performing loans, doubtful debts) portfolio 
remains with the institution under resolution.113  
 The purpose of the asset separation tool is to enable resolution authorities to 
transfer impaired or problem assets to an asset management vehicle to allow them to 
be managed and worked out over time.114 Assets should be transferred at market or 
long term economic value, so that any losses are recognised at the moment when the 
transfer takes place.115 The AMV will manage the transferred assets with a view to 
maximising their value through eventual sale or orderly wind down.116  
 The AMV is wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities which 
may include the resolution authority or the resolution financing arrangements.117 In line 
with the general resolution powers of the resolution authority to take over shareholder 
rights, the transfer may take place without the consent of shareholders of the institution 
under resolution or any third party, and without complying with any procedural 
requirements under company or security law.118 
 The resolution authority must ensure that the AMV operates and respects the 
following provisions, i.e. the resolution authority approves the content of the AMV‟s 
constitutional documents; the resolution authority either appoints or approves the 
AMV‟s management body; the resolution authority approves the remuneration of the 
members of the management body and determines their appropriate responsibilities; 
and the resolution authority approves the strategy and risk profile of the AMV.119 
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 The resolution authority must use the asset separation vehicle to transfer 
assets, rights and liabilities only in one of the following three scenarios120: i) the market 
conditions for those assets is of such a nature that their liquidation under normal 
insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on one or more financial markets; 
ii) the transfer is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the institution under 
resolution or bridge institution; and iii) the transfer is necessary to maximize the 
liquidation proceeds.    
 The funding structure of the AMV will depend on the value and characteristics 
of the assets transferred.121 If combined with the bail-in tool, the amount of bail-in has 
to take into account a prudent estimate of the capital needs of an AMV.122 Any 
consideration paid by the AMV in respect of the assets, rights or liabilities transferred 
directly from the institution under resolution may be paid in the form of debt issued by 
the AMV.123  
 The Directive124 restricts the liability of the AMV's management body or senior 
management to the shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution for acts 
or omissions in heir discharge of their duties who are liable only for gross negligence or 
serious misconduct. 
 Lastly, the difficulty in using the asset separation tool can be traced back to the 
way in which the choice of the transferred assets, rights or liabilities from the institution 
under resolution to the AMV will be made.  
  
2.4.3.1. The Bridge Institution Tool versus the Asset Separation Tool 
 The bridge institution and the asset separation tools are set up for a 
specific purpose, i.e. the transfer of rights, assets and liabilities from the institution 
under resolution. Both resolution tools are wholly or partially owned by one or more 
public authorities under the control of the national resolution authority. However, the 
main difference is the even more specific purpose of the asset management vehicle; as 
it is used to 'isolate' the impaired or under-performing assets from the performing 
assets of the institution under resolution; as the former are transferred to the AMV with 
a view to increasing their value before selling them in the open market.  
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2.4.4. The Bail-in Tool 
 In contrast to all the previous resolution tools, the bail-in tool enables primarily 
the resolution authorities to recapitalize a failing bank by means of the write-down of 
liabilities and/or conversion to equity, so that the bank can continue as a going 
concern- known as an 'open firm bail-in'.125 In other words, the bail-in tool will give 
resolution authorities the power to write down the claims of unsecured creditors of a 
failing bank and to convert debt claims to common equity instruments, such as a 
share126 in order to preserve the insolvent bank as an autonomous legal entity (going 
concern solution).127 
 The Directive permits the use of the bail-in tool before the bank has been 
placed into insolvency proceeding, when the institution is still a going concern ('open' 
firm bail-in) in order to restore its ability to comply with the conditions for authorization 
and so to continue performing its authorized activities, and to sustain market 
confidence in the institution,128 or the bank as a 'gone concern' subject to the exercise 
of the resolution powers ('closed' firm bail-in).129 When the bail-in tool is applied to 
recapitalise a bank (Article 51(1)), it must be accompanied by a business 
reorganisation plan (Article 52) aimed at restoring long-term viability, subject to the 
approval of the resolution authority. 
 The power to write-down capital instruments (Art. 59 of the BRRD) is not meant 
to be a resolution tool, but it works as an ancillary tool or a tool that can be exercised 
outside any resolution measures, as it looks very similar to the bail-in tool, as long as 
debt instruments can be either written down or converted into equity.130 A clear 
distinction with bail-in appears in a group context, as on bail-in, the Directive follows a 
clear entity-by-entity approach, this principle is loosened regarding the write-down 
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instrument, because article 59(4) rules that the point of non viability refers not only to a 
single institution but rather to the group itself.131  
 The bail-in is used to convert to equity or reduce the principal amount of claims 
or debt instruments that would be transferred to a bridge institution or that would be 
transferred under the sale of business tool or asset separation and the residual part of 
the institution ceases to operate and is wound up.132 
 The resolution authorities must ensure that the institutions avoid to structure 
their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail-in tool, as it is 
appropriate to establish that the institutions meet at all times a minimum requirement 
for own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities 
and own funds of the institution.133 
 Under the bail-in resolution tool, the shareholders and creditors of a failing bank 
suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of the costs arising from the 
failure of the institution.134 This is the key principle of the new resolution framework, as 
shareholders and creditors must contribute first to cover the losses and the 
recapitalization of the insolvent or near insolvent bank, in place of taxpayers, increasing 
at the same time, the investors' incentives to monitor banks in an adequate way. 135 
 The write-down or conversion will follow the ordinary allocation of losses 
according to creditor hierarchy in normal insolvency proceedings, equity must absorb 
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losses in full before any debt claim is subject to bail in.136 Specifically, the resolution 
authorities should apply the bail-in tool in a way that respects the pari passu treatment 
of creditors137 and the statutory ranking of claims under the applicable insolvency law. 
Losses should first be absorbed by regulatory capital instruments and should be 
allocated to shareholders either through the cancellation or transfer of shares or 
through severe dilution. Where those instruments are not sufficient, subordinated debt 
should be converted or written down. Senior liabilities should be converted or written 
down if the subordinate classes have been converted or written down entirely.138  
 The BRRD139 provides that the bail-in tool can be applied to all liabilities that are 
not expressly excluded from the scope of the bail-in. The Directive excludes the 
following liabilities: the holders of covered deposits140; secured liabilities including 
covered bonds and liabilities to the extent that they are secured; client assets or client 
money to the extent to the extent that they are protected under the applicable 
insolvency law; liabilities that arise by virtue of a fiduciary relationship between the 
institution and another person; liabilities owed to institutions with an original maturity of 
less than seven days (excluding entities that are part of the same group; liabilities owed 
to central counterparties with a remaining maturity of less than seven days; liabilities 
owed to employees (except variable remuneration); liabilities to 'critical' trade creditors; 
liabilities owed to tax and social security authorities provided that they are preferred 
under the normal insolvency proceedings; and liabilities arising from contributions to 
deposit guarantee scheme.141  
 In contrast, the mechanism of optional exclusions is more diversified, including 
exclusions left to the resolution authority's decision when exceptional circumstances 
occur. The optional exclusions from bail-in regards the liabilities that cannot bail-in 
within a reasonable time and their exclusion is strictly necessary and is proportionate to 
achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines of the institution 
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under resolution or to avoid giving rise to widespread contagion142 and to avoid a 
destruction in value.143  However, the use of optional exclusions is clearly linked to the 
possibility of increasing the bail-in burden on other eligible liabilities, and must comply 
with the no creditor worse-off principle.144  
 The delineation of the scope of bail-in indicates that all unsecured debt with an 
original maturity of seven days or more will be bail-inable, while the main loophole 
derives from the special rules that apply to derivatives (to the extent that they are not 
excluded from the application of the bail-in tool, they may be bailed), liabilities arising 
from repos, other title transfer collateral agreements and short-term debt. To this end, 
in order to prevent banks from holding only exempt debts, there is a need to establish a 
minimum requirement for eligible liabilities,145 so as to ensure adequate loss coverage 
capacity and to prevent banks from changing the composition of liabilities in favour of 
excluded liabilities.146 
 Lastly, the scenario of possible contagion effects on investors and other 
financial institutions that hold bonds eligible for bail-in is present, demanding an 
accurate calculation of the possible negative effects deriving from the existence of such 
powers of cancellation, as creditors might withdraw their deposits at the first signals of 
difficulties of the bank, thus exacerbating the bank‟s crisis.147 
 
2.4.4.1. Bail ins- versus Bail-outs 
 A Bail-out occurs when outside persons, i.e. persons other than shareholders or 
creditors, such as governments, rescue an institution by injecting public capital to 
prevent negative consequences to the financial system or the economy that would 
arise from the institution's failure.148 The bail-out is connected with 'the too big to fail' 
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test and the 'too interconnected to fail' test. During the previous decade149, 
governments inject money into banks on an unprecedented scale. After the recent 
crisis, the Financial Stability Board declared that 'an effective resolution regime must 
not rely on public solvency support and not create an expectation that such support will 
be available'.150 In the same line, the EU legal framework for bank recovery and 
resolution specified the powers of the resolution authorities to intervene both before 
problems occur and early on in the process if any problems arise, securing the rescue 
of the institution's critical functions in case the financial situation is beyond repair while 
the costs of restructuring and resolving failing banks fall upon the bank's owners and 
creditors and not on taxpayers.151,152 
 In contrast, a bail-in occurs when the institution's shareholders and creditors 
bear the burden by having an appropriate portion of their debt written off or converted 
into equity.153 The bail-in tool will therefore give shareholders and creditors of 
institutions a stronger incentive to monitor the health of an institution during normal 
circumstances and meets the FSB's Key Attributes.154  
 
2.5. Additional Provisions: Government Financial Stabilization Tools 
 The final version of the BRRD added another tool, known as government 
financial stabilization tools. The BRRD does not exclude the possibility of 'putting' 
public money into the banks in an extraordinary situation (i.e. systemic crisis), following 
the strict conditions of Arts. 37 (10), 56, 57 and 58 of the Directive and the 
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Commission's approval in accordance with the state aid framework of Art. 107 
TFEU.155 
 According to Art. 37 (10) of the Directive, the resolution authority has the 
possibility to seek funding through the use of government stabilization tools in case that 
a bail-in of at least 8% of bank liabilities has been applied and authorisation for the use 
of State aid has been obtained. According to Art. 56 (3) of the Directive, the 
government financial stabilization tools must be used as a last resort after having 
assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the maximum extent predictable 
whilst maintaining financial stability and after determining that the application of the 
resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial 
system and to protect the public interest where extraordinary liquidity assistance from 
the central bank or equity support has already been provided.156 When applying the 
tool of temporary public ownership, no other resolution tool (i.e. sale of business, asset 
separation, bridge tool, bail-in) can adequately protect the public interest. The 
activation of financial stabilisation tools is entrusted to government authorities, in 
collaboration with the resolution authority,157 and may consist of public equity support 
(Art. 57 of the BRRD) and a temporary public ownership (Art. 58 of the BRRD). 
 According to Art. 57 (1) of the Directive, Member States when participate in the 
recapitalisation of the institution -in compliance with their national company law- by 
providing capital in exchange for Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1), additional Tier 1 
instruments or Tier 2 instruments. Additionally, the financial institutions subject to public 
equity support tool must be managed on a commercial and professional basis and be 
transferred to the private sector when the market circumstances allow (Art. 57 para. 3). 
 Lastly, under Art. 58 of the Directive, Member States are allowed to fully take 
over an institution, ensuring that the institutions subject to the temporary ownership are 
managed on a commercial and professional basis and that they are transferred to the 
private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow.  
 
2.6. An Overview of the BRRD's Resolution Strategy 
 The BRRD has expressly recognized both the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) and 
the Multiple Point of Entry (MPOE) approaches for resolving global financial  
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institutions. In a Single Point of Entry strategy, there is one resolution entity, while in 
the Multiple Point of Entry there is more than one resolution entity. The two polar 
resolution strategies are applicable to very different business models. The MPOE 
resolution strategy is applicable to the decentralized business model while the SPOE to 
the centralized business model. The SPOE is more consistent with wholesale banking 
under the legal structure of branches, centralised capital and liquidity management, 
and significant intragroup positions; while the MPE fits better with retail banking, funded 
with local deposits, under the legal structure of subsidiaries, decentralised capital and 
liquidity management, and very limited intragroup positions.158 Under the MPOE 
resolution strategy, each resolution authority performs a separate resolution (if 
necessary), drawing on loss-absorbing capital that is held separately by national 
holding companies in each jurisdiction which is not shared across jurisdictions.159 In the 
SPOE model, a global bank is recapitalized by writing off debt or equity issued by a 
single global holding company that owns banking subsidiaries in multiple jurisdictions 
while the loss absorbing capacity is shared across jurisdictions.160  
 
3. The US Regulatory Developments on Bank Resolution 
 
 The banking sector has been one of the most highly regulated sectors in the US 
due to their special role in allocating credit and operating the payments system. The 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 disrupted the US economy and its banking sector. It is 
widely compared to the Great Depression of 1929, as the financial and economic 
circumstances associated with the US subprime mortgage crisis161 and the following 
financial institutions' failures that led to a severe worldwide economic disaster.162 The 
US regulatory framework developed a more promising strategy for dealing with 
troubled financial institutions.  
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3.1. Background 
 The US law provides several legal frameworks for resolving distressed or failed 
financial institutions. The US has developed the so-called 'dual banking system', 
meaning that in the US financial institutions can be chartered by one of the 50 states or 
at federal level. 163  
 The US federal banking statutes can be traced back to 1860s when the 
National Bank Act of 1863 created the basic framework for the US banking system and 
the chartering of national banks; the Federal Reserve Act enacted in 1914 creating the 
Federal Reserve System; the US Banking Act of 1933 created the system of federal 
deposit insurance; established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter 
FDIC)  and separated the commercial from the investment banks; the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act of 1950 (FDI Act) consolidated the prior FDIC legislation into one act and 
authorizing FDIC as the receiver and restructurer of failed banks; the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) requires Federal Reserve approval for a company to 
acquire a bank (and thereby become a BHC) and requires BHCs to obtain prior Federal 
Reserve approval to acquire an interest in additional banks and certain non-bank 
companies; the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA) established the framework for 
federal supervision of foreign banks operating in the US; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 repealed the provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 that separated investment 
banks from commercial banks and authorized the creation of the Financial Holding 
Companies (FHCs); and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 that was enacted in response to 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (before the publication of the Key Attributes).164 
 
3.2. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (known as 
the Dodd-Frank Act) enacted in 2010 and constituted the greatest legislative overhaul 
of financial services regulation in the American history since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s and made significantly changes to the US bank regulatory framework.165 The 
US banking regulators have frequently implemented a more stringent ('super 
equivalent') version of rules that are part of the post-financial regulatory agenda 
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established by the Dodd-Frank Act and by the international standards as were set out 
by the G20, the BCBS and the FSB. 166 The central aim of the Act was to avoid a re-
occurrence of the 2007 financial calamity, by including measures to improve systemic 
stability and policy options for dealing with financial institutions, to increase 
transparency and to protect consumers and investors.167 
 In 2017 President Donald Trump signed an executive order directing regulators 
to review the Dodd-Frank Act, arguing at the same time that the Dodd-Frank Act needs 
to be abolished.168 In response to this direction, the House of Representatives passed 
the Financial Choice Act of 2017 rolling back sections of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted on 
the 24th May 2018169, made changes that will have the greatest impact on small 
financial institutions. Some of the Act‟s more noteworthy changes include removal of 
certain Volcker Rule limitations on hedge fund and private equity fund naming 
conventions, the exemption of most small banks from the purview of the Volcker 
Rule170, reduced regulatory burdens for small and medium-sized bank holding 
companies, changes favorably affecting custodial banks‟ supplementary leverage ratio 
calculations, expansion of public securities offering rules to closed-end exchange listed 
funds, and beneficial capital treatment of certain real estate exposures and municipal 
obligations that make investments in such assets more attractive to banks under bank 
capital rules.171 
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3.2.1. An Overview of the Banking Regulatory Agencies in the US 
 The American law introduces several federal regulatory agencies dealing with 
the banking legal framework. The US bank regulatory agencies are the following:172 
 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ('Federal Reserve Board'): 
The Federal Reserve System is the central banking system of the US and conducts 
its monetary policy. The Federal Reserve supervises Bank Holding Companies 
(BHCs) and Financial Holding Companies (FHCs), state-chartered banks that are 
members of the Federal Reserve System, the US activities of Foreign Banks 
Operations (FBOs), and Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) 
designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The Dodd-Frank 
Act provided substantial regulatory authority to the Board of Governs of the Federal 
Reserve to ensure the stability and survival of the SIFIs.173  
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which is the primary regulator 
for state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System as 
well as state-chartered thrifts. The FDIC insures bank and thrift deposits and has 
receivership174 powers over banks and certain other financial institutions. 
 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC): Prior to the creation of the 
FDIC, the OCC was in charge of supervising the liquidation of national banks. The 
OCC is an independent bureau of the US Department of the Treasury led by the 
Comptroller of the Currency that charters, regulates, and supervises all national 
banks and federal saving associations as well as federal branches and agencies of 
foreign banks. 
 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) which was created by the Dodd-
Frank Act in order to oversee the stability of the US financial economy and is 
empowered to designate non-bank SIFIs for supervision by the Federal Reserve. 
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3.3. The Financial Institutions falling under the scope of the Dodd- Frank Act  
 During the crisis, the absence of an adequate and credible resolution regime on 
the part of the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) in combination with 
the complexity of their structure as 'international institutions', highlighted some of the 
deficiencies in the American resolution legal framework. At that time, the FDIC‟s 
receivership authorities were limited to federally insured banks and thrift institutions, 
while the lack of authority to place a holding company or affiliates of an insured 
depository institution (IDI) or any other non-bank financial company into an FDIC 
receivership to avoid systemic consequences limited policymakers‟ options, leaving 
them with the poor choice of bail-outs or disorderly bankruptcy.175 In the aftermath of 
the crisis, the US enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 which introduced a set of changes to financial regulation, and was amended in 
2018, cited as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  
 
3.3.1. The Dodd Frank Act of 2010 
 Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, a new resolution regime was introduced to 
resolve large Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and Foreign Bank Operations (FBOs) 
with total global consolidated assets of $50 billion (now $250 billion), and non-bank 
financial companies designated by FSOC as SIFIs. Title I and II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
provides new authorities to the FDIC and other regulatory agencies (i.e. FSOC) to deal 
with the failure of a SIFI. In other words, prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
bank regulators had extensive resolution powers with commercial bank subsidiaries but 
did not have resolution authority over the bank holding company or nonbank affiliates, 
each of which was subject to the ordinary bankruptcy process. Title I requires all 
companies covered under it to prepare resolution plans, or “living wills”, to demonstrate 
how they would be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner under the Bankruptcy Code 
(or other applicable insolvency regime) in the event of material financial distress or 
failure.176 Title II provides a back-up authority to place a SIFI into an FDIC receivership 
process if no viable private-sector alternative is available to prevent the default of the 
financial company and if a resolution through the bankruptcy process would have 
serious adverse effects on US financial stability, providing the FDIC new Orderly 
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Liquidation authority (OLA) that provides the tools necessary to ensure the rapid and 
orderly resolution of a covered financial company.177 
 
3.3.2. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2018 
 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2018, raised the threshold at which a bank is considered 
as a SIFI from $50 billion to $ 250 billion-keeping the main pillars of post-crisis 
regulation intact.178 A win for the mid-sized banks is a change to the threshold at which 
banks must comply with additional regulatory requirements that are applicable under 
the systemically important threshold. Firms with between $50 billion and $100 billion in 
total assets are released immediately from mandatory application of additional 
regulatory requirements, while “middle tier” BHCs with $100 billion to $250 billion in 
total assets will be released in 18 months although they will still need to meet certain 
additional regulatory requirements.179 
 Even the Dodd-Frank Act of 2018 changed the threshold for additional 
regulatory requirements; the Federal Reserve System and other regulatory agencies 
will decide whether to adjust other thresholds, such as the Federal Reserve Board's 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), the OCC‟s heightened 
standards and recovery planning, and the FDIC‟s insured depository institution 
resolution requirements that apply to banks with over $50 billion in assets.180 
 The foreign bank counterparts of the US banks have been left with questions 
and an ongoing debate under the 2018 Act. Currently, the Federal Reserve Board 
applies additional scrutiny to Foreign Banking Organizations (FBOs) holding $50 billion 
or more in total global assets, but applies increasingly stringent requirements based on 
US asset size, including the requirement to establish an Intermediate Holding 
Company (IHC) in the US for Foreign Bank Operations (FBOs) that also hold $50 
billion or more in combined US non-branch assets.181 Dashing hopes that the increased 
SIFI threshold would also apply to FBOs, the law clarifies that the Fed still maintains 
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discretion to apply additional regulatory requirements and Intermediate Holding 
Company (IHC) requirements to FBOs with global assets over $100 billion.182 
 
3.4. The Resolution Tools under the Dodd-Frank Act 
 The Dodd-Frank Act adopted the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) a new 
resolution regime to address systemic risk of non-bank financial companies. Title II183 
of the Dodd-Frank Act regulates a bail-in process that is meant to provide an 
alternative to the US bankruptcy proceedings. Under the Dodd-Frank Act‟s OLA 
provisions, the FDIC has been given enhanced resolution tools for use in the resolution 
of a systemically important financial company, including: an immediate liquidity source 
to maintain asset values and essential functions; the ability to transfer all qualified 
financial contracts with a counterparty so as to avoid immediate contract 
termination/netting of positions and the attendant shocks to the financial system; and 
the ability to conduct advance resolution planning, including through the use of detailed 
„living wills‟, which institutions are required to prepare and keep on file in order to 
facilitate the wind up of their affairs.184 
 
3.4.1. The Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) 
 Orderly Liquidation Authority covers the US bank holding companies with $250 
billion or more in total consolidated assets, any foreign company bank or any company 
that controls a foreign bank that has a US bank, branch, agency or commercial lending 
company subsidiary and at least -until an adjustment of threshold is decided- $50 
billion in total global consolidated assets; and any non-bank financial company 
designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as a SIFI.185 In 
determining whether a 'covered financial company' must be placed in receivership 
under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, certain distress financial findings are made. The 
'covered financial company' must be in default or in danger of default, i.e. the company 
is insolvent or will be unable to pay its debts as they come due in the ordinary course of 
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its business or in danger of becoming such,186 and the reorganization or liquidation of 
the 'covered financial company' under the normal proceedings of the US bankruptcy 
code would pose serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the US.187  
 Therefore, the choice between Bankruptcy code and the OLA is  a 'two part test' 
that is made upon failure on the individual merits of the case.188 If these findings are 
made and the US Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC agree, they file a secret 
petition in a federal Court in Washington, D.C. The court approves the authorization of 
the aforementioned bank regulators to intervene so long as the 'toxic' financial 
institution is engages primarily in financial activities and is in default or in danger to 
default.189 Then, the FDIC is appointed as receiver for a 'covered financial company' 
and becomes the manager of the assets, liabilities and operations of the 'covered 
financial institution'. Under Title II of the Act, the FDIC must replace the management 
members who were responsible for the institution's financial condition, to impose 
losses on shareholders and creditors, and to liquidate the 'covered' financial 
institution.190 
 Specifically, the FDIC is responsible for transferring or selling the company's 
assets (asset sale) or other liabilities to a third party at a fair value, or establishing 
bridge institutions.191 The FDIC has the power to cancel any previous transfers, 
agreements or leases that prevent the FDIC's mission.192 The FDIC is the manager of 
the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF) that is a separate fund in the US Treasury and its 
aim is to assist fund the liquidation procedure.193 In case that the financial company is a 
broker or dealer, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is additionally -
to the FDIC's appointment- appointed as trustee that will take over any remained 
assets that were not transferred to a bridge institution from the FDIC.194 The Securities 
Protection Investor Corporation (SIPC) shares responsibility for customer accounts. 
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 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act defines the claim process against a failed financial 
company and the list of priority payments.195 The list's aim is to ensure that directors, 
executives and shareholders will bear the losses as they cannot receive any payment 
until all the other claims are paid. Title II includes provisions regarding the management 
and board members' liability, including their removal as responsible for the company's 
financial condition.196 
 Under Title II, SIFIs have to produce plans for a rapid and orderly wind-up in the 
event of financial distress or failure. The FDIC has issued rules -jointly with the Federal 
Reserve Board- to establish standards for resolution plans and credit exposure reports, 
that 'covered financial companies' must submit to the FRB, the FDIC and the FSOC.197 
Separately, the large FDIC-insured depository institutions are required to submit 
periodic contingency plans to the FDIC, which provides depositors access to insured 
deposits and minimizes loss to creditors.198 The former provisions focus on minimizing 
systemic risk while the latter aims to protect the insured depositors and to minimize 
loss. 
 Lastly, the Act stipulates the FDIC's role as a receiver can be a maximum of 3 
years, with the possibility of two 1-year extensions,199 as Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
requires the liquidation of any 'received' financial institution.  
 
3.4.1.1. Questioning the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) of the Dodd-Frank 
Act 
 The Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) has many legal issues that could 
prevent its use.200 Although Title II of the Act provides a framework of rules, the rules 
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provide only a sketchy picture of what a resolution might actually look like.201 Title II of 
the Dodd-Frank Act regulates the liquidation of any 'covered' financial institution. Title II 
does not force the American bank regulators to intervene in a timely stage, creating 
uncertainty about the application of the OLA regime. Furthermore, the uncertainty 
regarding the protection of the short-term creditors in case that the financial institution 
will be liquidated under the OLA process, challenging the effectiveness of the new 
resolution regime. 
 
3.4.1.2. A more promising strategy for implementing Title II of the Dodd-Frank 
Act 
 Over the past several years, the FDIC202 tried to fill in the picture with a 
remarkable new strategy for implementing Title II, known as the  Single Point of Entry 
(SPOE).203 By taking this approach the bank regulators are able can: 1) provide for the 
continuity of the company‟s significant business operations; 2) preserve the material 
operating subsidiaries as going concerns, thereby preserving their value for the benefit 
of the company‟s creditors and reducing the risk of economic disruption; 3) impose the 
losses arising from the company‟s failure on the shareholders and creditors of the 
parent company; 4) reduce the potential for conflict between regulators in different 
jurisdictions, as well as the risk that the subsidiaries‟ contractual counterparties will 
exercise termination rights as a result of the parent‟s failure.204 
 In a single point of entry resolution, the bank regulators would recapitalize a 
troubled systemically important bank rather than liquidating it. In a single-point-of-entry 
strategy, bank regulators would put the financial institution‟s holding company into 
resolution, leaving subsidiaries to continue operations. The FDIC is appointed as 
receiver of the US parent holding company of the failed financial institution. Then, the 
FDIC transfers the top-tier holding company's assets from the receivership, any short-
term liabilities, and any secured obligations to a new bridge institution while leaving its 
stock and long-term unsecured debt (primarily bonds) behind in the old financial 
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institution.205 The transfer would create a well-capitalized new institution, as the FDIC 
would use 1) the available parent holding liabilities to recapitalize the new bridge 
holding company through a bail-in tool and 2) large amounts of liquidity from the US 
Treasury for the holding company or subsidiaries, and the FDIC would eventually 
distribute some or all of the equity of the new institution to the old long-term debt 
holders, while most likely wiping out the old stock.206 
 The FDIC is responsible for the structure of the new bridge institution and so it 
must determine the value of the bridge financial company in order later to be able to 
conduct a claims process and thus, to establish a claims priority hierarchy, as there will 
be classes of claimants, each demanding their new share of equity. 
 In this sense, the single-point-of-entry strategy is made possible by the unusual 
structure of large US financial institutions, as the US financial institution groups 
generally have a top-level holding company whose capital structure includes 
substantial amounts of combined capital, i.e. bonds and other long-term unsecured 
debt, but relatively few derivatives and other short-term debt, while the short-term debt 
and much of the group‟s operations are in subsidiaries.207 Under the SPOE approach, 
the liabilities of the top-level holding company are subordinated to the customer 
obligations at the institutions' operating subsidiaries, while at the same time, the equity 
and debt at the holding company form a buffer that must be absorbed before any 
subsidiary suffers losses. The success of the SPOE model depends on the sufficient 
amount of debt and equity at the holding company to both absorb losses in the failed 
firm and capitalize the new bridge holding institution. 
 The single of point strategy has gained recognition among regulators as 
imposes fewer demands on regulators than putting the entire holding company 
framework into resolution and reduces the risk that foreign subsidiaries would face 
liquidity crises at the outset of the resolution.208 
 
3.4.2.The Bail-out Tool under the Dodd-Frank Act   
 Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits the use of taxpayer funds in order to 
prevent the liquidation of any institution that has been put into receivership under Title 
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II.209 This provision, prohibits any future bail-out for struggling financial institutions, 
clarifying that there is no safety bailout net for troubled financial institutions that will 
have to liquidate under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. Even the elimination of 
government bailouts for struggling financial institutions is clearly declared, the Act is 
referred to the emergency lending program strategy or any facility that are provided for 
the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system.210 The Act empowered the 
Federal Reserve to act as a lender of last resort, restricting at the same time its lending 
powers as it prohibits the Federal Reserve's power to make emergency loans in order 
to rescue a single financial institution. 
 
4. The EU versus US Resolution Tools under the BRRD and the 
Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, both the US and the EU made 
much effort to improve their resolution legal framework. In this regard, both regions 
established new resolution rules and guidance with common goals, i.e. providing 
powers to resolution authorities to resolve financial institutions in a quick and effective 
process that will ensure the stability of the financial system and to eliminate the 
taxpayers' contribution to resolution rescues. In the US and in the EU resolution 
approaches, the resolution is triggered when i) a failing or likely to fail institution is 
detected; ii) public interest and financial stability considerations are present and iii) 
there are no -private- alternative solutions according to existing market conditions that 
could prevent the institution's default. Besides these common principles, the two most 
affected financial markets, have developed different approaches to bank resolution. 
 Even as just mentioned, the US and the EU resolution regimes share the same 
trigger conditions for activating the resolution process, the US sets out one additional 
condition, i.e. when a US regulatory agency has ordered the financial company to 
convert all of its convertible instruments that are subject to the regulatory order.211
 Particularly in the US, the bank resolution approach depends on the legal entity 
in question. A US financial institution is normally resolved under the state banking laws 
(following the traditional resolution process) while the large and complex banks, i.e. 
SIFIs, are liquidated at federal level, under the Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. The US 
federal law supersedes state laws, allowing the implementation of a standardized 
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process, while in the EU, the postponement of the Banking Union delays the so much 
needed uniformity on the aspects of central banking governance.212 The Dodd-Frank 
Act extends the Federal Reserve's and FDIC's powers when dealing with troubled 
SIFIs, as previously only bankruptcy was available and the bank regulators' power in 
bankruptcy was limited.  
 In 2014, EU introduced the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) as 
a response to the demands for a reliable resolution legal framework. While the scope of 
the Dodd-Frank Act is limited, the BRRD covers all credit institutions and certain 
investment firms established in the EU. As explained above, under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
the FDIC has the resolution authority to take over a SIFI and to initiate the SPOE 
resolution model using the bridge institution tool. Under the BRRD, each Member State 
is responsible to appoint its national resolution authority that will work together with the 
European competent resolution authorities. The resolution decision scheme is more 
complex and less agile than in the resolution decision scheme in the US, due to the 
'more complex' EU institution structure.213 
 As the FSB mentioned,214 there are two stylized global resolution strategies that 
global financial institutions must apply, i.e. the Single Point of Entry and the Multiple 
Point of Entry. It is important to note that the majority of the US SIFIs are domestic and 
are generally organized in a holding company structure with a top-tier parent and 
operating subsidiaries that comprise hundreds, or even thousands, of interconnected 
entities.215 As a result of this, Dodd Frank Act establishes the SPOE strategy as the 
benchmark for resolving banks in the US while in the European context, the BRRD 
leaves more room for manoeuvre and allows both strategies, MPE and SPOE.216
 Precisely, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act adopts the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority, a new bail-in strategy of SIFIs. Title II demands the liquidation of any 
'covered' financial institution rather than its reorganization. The highly disputed 
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effectiveness of the new OLA regime, initiated the FDIC's response through the 
development of the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) approach, i.e. the resolution process 
was partially modified by the FDIC. The latter process generated much enthusiasm 
among regulators, promising the maintenance and continuity of the institution's critical 
services. The purpose of the SPOE process is to liquidate the top-tier bank holding 
company and to leave the subsidiaries continue their operations, either because the 
latter have remained solvent and viable, or because they can be recapitalized through 
the writing down of intra-group loans made from the holding company to its 
subsidiaries. In the US, a subsidiary would need to be resolved independently only in 
case it had large losses.   
 The European Union adopted a bail-in tool that aims at recapitalizing the 
troubled bank and keep it as a going concern. In contrast to the OLA regime, the BBRD 
allows also the use of the bail-in resolution tool before the troubled financial institution 
be treated as 'gone concern' ('closed bank' bail-in process). When the institution is in a 
'going concern' stage ('open bank' bail-in process) the EU bail-in tool aims to restore 
the institution's to meet the authorization requirements, to continue its critical 
operations and to maintain the market confidence. The EU bail-in tool is a precondition 
for bank resolution and for implemented bank recapitalization. National authorities must 
impose losses representing 8% of the institution's liabilities on shareholders and 
creditors217 before using the national resolution fund to absorb losses or to inject capital 
into the institution. The time element is essential when applying the bail-in tool as if the 
supervisor trigger bail-in too early, it may be necessary other rounds of bail-in, if losses 
are not fully revealed; if bail-in is used at a later stage instead, there is a risk of run of 
bank creditors who do not bail-inable debt.218 The Directive suggests for an application 
of bail-in in a „going concern‟ situation, while Title II of the Act is established at the 
moment the bank is closed without providing a specific timeframe based on which the 
regulators must intervene and take over the troubled financial company. 
 The EU and the US bail-in approaches raise practical implications for the cross-
border financial markets. The uninsured depositors may be bailed-in under the BRRD, 
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the same in not true under the Dodd-Frank Act in the US.219 The insured and uninsured 
depositors are ranked ahead of unsecured creditors in the American system while in 
the BRRD, there are different layers differentiating therefore the seniority of certain 
deposits. 220 The difference in the priority of claims may impede cross-border resolution 
by creating an uneven playing field for uninsured depositors.221 The two resolution 
regimes recognizes the deposit preference. Both legal frameworks have established a 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) but the difference in the amount which is insured by 
the public deposit guarantee scheme -in the US, deposits are guaranteed to a value 
which is at least twice the value of deposits guaranteed under schemes available in the 
EU- may exacerbated the just above mentioned impediment.222 The DGS will only 
absorb losses under liquidation but not in the resolution scheme while in the EU, the 
DGS has been excluded from the bail-in tool.223  
 Moreover, under the BRRD's provisions, the categories of liabilities to which a 
bail-in applies will remain unclear, as the resolution authorities have the authority to 
exclude certain liabilities to achieve specific objectives, such as to avoid contagion.224 
The BRRD establishes a 'minimum requirement for eligible liabilities' (MREL) to ensure 
that financial institutions have sufficient liabilities within the scope of the bail-in tool to 
achieve effective resolution and to avoid liquidation; an approach that derives from 
international regulatory commitments on bail-inable liabilities, referred as 'total loss 
absorbing capacity' (TLAC).225 However, the differences between the -quite stringent- 
MREL's and the TLAC's provisions with respect to the scope of eligible instruments, 
may create an uneven playing field for banks in different jurisdictions.226  
 As regards the way in which the resolution fund is used and the discretionality 
that is applied in its use by the resolution tools are following different paths in the US 
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and the EU framework.227 In the US, the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF) is established 
at the Treasury, and it is available to the FDIC in order to borrow funds (neither capital 
nor guarantees) while in the EU, each Member State establishes its own financing 
arrangements which would be available to support institutions under resolution via 
loans, guarantees, asset purchases or capital for bridge banks.228 In the US there is no 
preconditions in order to activate the OLF to funding the bridge institution while in the 
EU, when resolution authorities decide to exclude an eligible liability from bail-in, the 
resolution fund is used after a minimum level of 8% of total liabilities have been bailed-
in and in addition to purchase shares or other instruments of ownership or capital 
instruments of the institution under resolution.229 The EU resolution fund must be 
financed ex ante while in the US in an ex post contributing level. 
 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act bans struggling financial institutions that are 
under resolution process. However, the provisions are quite leaky as bank regulators 
can still bail-out the troubled financial institution, despite the restrictions imposed on the 
Federal Reserve's emergency lending powers.230 In Europe, in a very extraordinary 
situation the resolution authority and after the bail-in application, has access to the 
temporary public ownership and public equity support tool, while the US resolution 
regime does not envisage any public ownership.231  
 Lastly, it must be mentioned that the US rules stem from a long-standing legal 
regime and the FDIC's resolution model232 has been tested significantly more often 
than in the EU. Despite the BBRD 's new resolution framework that entered into force 
in 2015, the application of the bail-in tool was delayed until 2016. Most of the 
problematic EU cases occurred before the transposition of the BRRD and the 
implementation of the bail-in tool, but the credibility of the new resolution framework 
requires practical examples to prove that -the bail-in tool- actually works in practice. 233   
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Conclusions 
 The 2007-2008 financial disaster brought a severe destabilization in the 
financial system and showed the failure of market discipline and the government 
responses to minimize the problem, confirming the idea that some financial institutions 
are too big to fail.234 The crisis demonstrated the lack of sufficient and effective bank 
resolution regimes both in the EU and the US financial markets. In the decade since, 
the only choice of a government in front of a failure of a financial institution was to bail-
out the troubled company or to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding.235  
 In the aftermath of the crisis, international and regional regulators made efforts 
for setting out a more resilient financial resolution regime. Both the US and the EU 
regions, enacted new resolution frameworks as a buffer against market 
overconfidence. In the wake of the financial crisis, the US adopted the Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010 with the aim of preventing the reoccurrence of a crisis. The new US President 
initiated the procedure for amending the 2010 Act, while the rolling back of Dodd-Frank 
Act's sections took place in May 2018, 'saving' -partially- the middle-class financial 
institutions. However, the American financial regulation has been roundly criticized on a 
number of grounds, mainly on the basis of over-regulating the financial institutions and 
of hindering the competitiveness of the US financial economy vis-a-vis foreign 
companies.236  
 Similarly, EU introduced the BRRD in 2014 as a response to the crisis, 
introducing a 'unified' resolution framework. The Directive set out a quite stringent 
framework for all credit institutions and certain investment firms. The key resolution tool 
of the Directive, i.e. bail-in tool, has been broadly characterised as 'too complex to 
work'.237 On 23 November 2016,238 the Commission presented its proposal to amend 
                                                                                                                                               
resolution framework: is there an issue with the middle class?' (23 March 2018), available online at 
<https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp180323.htm>, accessed 8 January 2019. 
234
 A. Fantuzzi, A modern resolution tool to TBTF, in Riv. dir. banc., dirittobancario.it, 20, 2016, available 
online at <http://www.dirittobancario.it/rivista/crisi-bancarie/modern-resolution-tool-tbtf>, accessed 8 
January 2019. 
235
 Ibid,. 
236
 Corporate Finance Institute, 'Dodd-Frank Act: The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010' (2018), available online at <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/ 
dodd-frank-act/>, accessed 10 January 2019. 
237
 Tobias H. Troger, 'Too Complex to Work: A critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive', Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability , Working Paper 
Series No. 116 (2017), available online at <https://www.imfs-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
IMFS_WP_116.pdf.>, accessed 10 January 2019. 
238
 European Commission, 'Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL amending Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 
2012/30/EU, Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 
A Comparative analysis of the EU and the US bank resolution regimes: The resolution tools 
under the BRRD and the Dodd Frank Act 
 
  -43- 
the BRRD in order to incorporate the FSB's standards on G-SIFIs' loss-absorbing and 
recapitalization.239 The two regions most greatly affected, the US and the EU, have 
developed distinct approaches to bank resolution; 'it is like comparing apples and 
pears, both are fruits that share similar colors'.240 What has been set up in Europe in 
the past four or five years is still in its infancy in comparison to the US powers, 
infrastructure, the people, or the training.241 It is a matter of time to see whether the 
plurality of national political pressures and interests242 will continue to keep back or will 
permit the completion of the European Banking Union, interests that don't exist in the 
US.  
 The arising question for the American continent is whether the US will permit 
the survival of the Dodd-Frank Act or will -even more- roll back its strict provisions, 
drafting another path for the financial industry that may or may not be based on the 
legal entity, the entity's assets, or its 'importance' for the American economy. In the EU, 
the main dilemma is whether the European authorities will be able to introduce a truly 
'unified' resolution framework when managing banks or non-bank financial institutions 
and consequently, promote the process of integration; or will permit the national 
powers and the problems of political legitimacy that have plagued the EU for decades, 
to impose their sclerotic structures.243  
 In conclusion, a common question is therefore: whether the 'converging air' 
between the two continents will be transformed into a 'home jurisdiction', creating an 
even playing field for the -without borders- financial institutions under resolution or will 
continue following different paths, showing a complete disregard for the need to 
harmonize and improve the resolutions regimes and especially, the resolution tools for 
dealing with financial institutions crises. 
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